Trackademia

Welcome to Trackademia

The idea behind Trackademia is to build on existing academic databases like Google Scholar and OpenAlex so that you can trust the data and use it for whatever you want. That comes down to two things.

More data, and more ways to use it. We aggregate publication data from every major source into a single dataset and add information pulled from faculty CVs. Then we let you slice it however you want: choose which sources to build from, write your own formulas, weight journals, adjust for department size.

More accurate, and honest about where it isn’t. We focus on a smaller set of schools so we can verify everything carefully. Faculty lists come from department websites rather than being inferred from publication records, so we know who should be in the data before we go looking. When we can’t find data on someone, we record the gap instead of dropping them. Every number comes with a coverage rate you can check against ground truth.

Everything in Trackademia is built from seven units. AI merges duplicate records across sources and tags each publication so these categories hold up:

  • Publication — citation counts, authors, journal, peer review status, and more
  • Publication group — versions of the same work combined into one entity, such as a working paper and the article it became
  • Academic
  • Department
  • University
  • Field
  • Journal

There are two modes. In Database mode you browse the underlying records and filter by any of the seven units. In Analytics mode you get graphs and comparisons, and you switch views to compare two departments, compare one department against the average of the others, or see them all at once. Tabs let you focus on a particular level of the data.

Trackademia

Every graph on this site

Publications

  • Ranking Ranked table
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications
    • Measure: Total, Mean per work, Median per work
  • Works published per year Lines over years
    • Measure: Total, Mean per academic, Median per academic
    • Calendar year or years since PhD
    • In each year or cumulative
  • Citations received per year Lines over years
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations
    • Measure: Total, Mean per work, Median per work, Mean per academic, Median per academic
    • In each year or cumulative
  • Citation distribution Bars
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations
  • Citations by age of work Lines over years
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations
    • Measure: Total, Mean per work, Median per work
  • Publication type mix Ranked bars
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications
  • Top venues Ranked bars
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications

Academicshere

Departments

  • Ranking Ranked table
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications
    • Measure: Total, Mean per work, Median per work, Mean per academic, Median per academic, Formula
  • Publications over time Lines over years
    • Measure: Total, Mean per academic, Median per academic, Formula
    • Calendar year or years since PhD
    • In each year or cumulative
  • Citations over time Lines over years
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations
    • Measure: Total, Mean per academic, Median per academic, Formula
    • In each year or cumulative
  • Makeup by tenure track Stacked bars
  • Output by rank Grouped bars
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications
    • Measure: Total, Mean per work, Median per work, Mean per academic, Median per academic, Formula
  • Academics ranked against academics Grouped bars
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications
    • How many ranks (opens on 5)
  • Years to promotion Grouped bars
  • Journals used Stacked bars
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications

Journals

Fields

  • Ranking Ranked table
    • Value: Citations, Weighted citations, Publications
    • Measure: Total, Mean per work, Median per work, Mean per academic, Median per academic
  • Departments by field Bars
    • Measure: Total, Mean per work, Median per work, Mean per academic, Median per academic
  • University rollup Ranked bars
  • Coverage by field Ranked bars

Trackademia

Search the whole site

Search a person, a department, a journal or the title of a work. A person’s name brings up their profile, their publications, their department and the journals they publish in.

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Academic

Adam Meirowitz

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Academic

RankDistinguished
As of2022 · CV
DepartmentYale Political Science
UniversityYale
FieldPolitical Science
Scholarprofile

Totals

Publications50
Citations3,962
h-index28 · Scholar
Citations per year in post165.1
Years in post24 from the CV positions

Coverage

Works with a count46 of 50
Share92%

Positions

Damon Wells Professor, Yale University, New H…2022–
Visiting Professor, Princeton University, Pri…2018–2020
Director, Marriner S. Eccles Institute for Ec…2017–
Acting Chair, David Eccles School of Business…2016–2016
Kem C. Gardner Professor, David Eccles School…2015–2022
John Work Garrett Professor of Politics, Prin…2009–2015
Director, Quantitative and Analytical Politic…2009–2015
Associate Professor of Politics, Princeton Un…2006–2009
Assistant Professor of Politics, Princeton Un…2002–2006
Instructor of Politics, Princeton University,…2001–2002
Damon Wells Professor, Yale University
Research Staff, Cowles Foundation, Yale Unive…

Top venues 26 venues

The 15 holding the most of these works; 11 more hold at least one.

American Journal of Political Science5
Quarterly Journal of Political Science4
Political Analysis3
Social Choice and Welfare3
American Political Science Review2
Games and Economic Behavior2
Journal of Theoretical Politics2
Legislative Studies Quarterly2
Perspectives on Politics2
Political Science Research and Methods2
The Journal of Politics2
Cambridge University Press eBooks1
Economic Theory1
Economics and Politics1
Economics Letters1

Collaborators 1 collaborator

Over every shown department of this field, not only the ones the filters select. 1 of these 50 works are held by another academic here; the column adds to more than that, because a work three of them hold is a shared work with each of the other two.

CollaboratorDepartmentShared works
Nolan McCartyPrinceton Politics1

Publications per year

Works this academic published in each year, by the year each work appeared; an undated work is in no year, and a work two colleagues wrote counts for each of them. The publication type, works filters decide which works are here at all.

Citations per year

Citations received in each year, from this academic’s verified Scholar profile, which counts every citation to everything they ever wrote: no publication filter reaches this line - not the publication types, not the works switch, not the year window on publication - and no weight either. It is a profile total, so it does not match the works listed below.

Publications 50 works

Every work these filters select, most cited first and the works with no count at the end: a work nobody has a figure for is unknown, never a zero to be ranked among the works that have one, and it prints an em dash. Each figure is that work’s own citations - Scholar’s count where there is one, else OpenAlex’s - and is not weighted.

YearTitleVenuePublication typeCitations
2004Spatial models of delegationAmerican Political Science Reviewarticle603
2007Political Game Theory: An Introductionarticle431
2006Political Game TheoryCambridge University Press eBooksbook431
2008Electoral Contests, Incumbency Advantages, and Campaign FinanceThe Journal of Politicsarticle206
2005Informational party primaries and strategic ambiguityJournal of Theoretical Politicsarticle193
2008Strategic Uncertainty as a Cause of WarQuarterly Journal of Political Sciencearticle190
2009Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative DemocracyAmerican Journal of Political Sciencearticle183
2008Design, Inference, and the Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.American Political Science Reviewarticle140
2007In defense of exclusionary deliberation: Communication and voting with private beliefs and valuesJournal of Theoretical Politicsarticle120
2001Agenda constrained legislator ideal Points and the spatial voting modelPolitical Analysisarticle116
2013People Power or a One Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest:American Journal of Political Sciencearticle104
2014Introducing Deterrence through Moral Hazard in Alliance ContractsJournal of Conflict Resolutionarticle92
2004Testing explanations of strategic voting in legislatures: A reexamination of the Compromise of 1790American Journal of Political Sciencearticle88
2003Integrating roll call analysis and voting theory: A frameworkPolitical Analysisarticle88
2002Minority Rights and Majority Power: Theoretical Consequences of the Motion to RecommitLegislative Studies Quarterlyarticle83
2009Pivots versus Signals in ElectionsJournal of Economic Theoryarticle82
2019Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic MilitarizationJournal of Political Economyarticle81
2006Designing Institutions to Aggregate Preferences and InformationQuarterly Journal of Political Sciencearticle70
2002Informative voting and Condorcet jury theorems with a continuum of typesSocial Choice and Welfarearticle61
2022Voting and Trading: The Shareholder’s DilemmaJournal of Financial Economicsarticle51
2005Polling games and information revelation in the Downsian frameworkGames and Economic Behaviorarticle50
2007Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Repeated Elections with Uncertain Policy ConstraintsJournal of Public Economic Theoryarticle44
2007Run Boris Run: Strategic voting in electionsThe Journal of Politicsarticle43
2015A Theory of Competitive Partisan LawmakingPolitical Science Research and Methodsarticle41
2004Learning from terrorism marketsPerspectives on Politicsarticle39
2003On the existence of equilibria to Bayesian games with non-finite type and action spacesEconomics Lettersarticle35
2024Career Concerns and the Dynamics of Electoral AccountabilityAmerican Journal of Political Sciencearticle34
2012Evolution of Cooperation and Skew under Imperfect InformationProceedings of the National Academy of Sciencesarticle33
2017Sincere Voting in Large ElectionsGames and Economic Behaviorarticle28
2013Credibility of Peaceful Agreements in Crisis BargainingPolitical Science Research and Methodsarticle27
2012Lobbying and DiscretionEconomic Theoryarticle25
2016Changing Capabilities, uncertainty, and the risk of war in crisis bargainingResearch & Politicsarticle23
2004Testing accounts of legislative strategic voting: the compromise of 1790American Journal of Political Sciencearticle19
2022Third Party Intervention and Strategic MilitarizationQuarterly Journal of Political Sciencearticle17
2006Fully-revealing equilibria of multiple-sender signaling and screening modelsSocial Choice and Welfarearticle16
2007Communication and bargaining in the spatial modelInternational Journal of Game Theoryarticle15
2005Parties in elections, parties in government, and partisan biasPolitical Analysisarticle15
2005Contributions and elections with network externalitiesEconomics and Politicsarticle11
2005Keeping the other candidate guessing: electoral competition when preferences are private informationPublic Choicearticle8
2002Accountability and representation in repeated elections with uncertain policy constraintsarticle7
2004The core of social choice problems with monotone preferences and a feasibility constraintSocial Choice and Welfarearticle5
2002Power and the motion to recommitLegislative Studies Quarterlyarticle5
2004Learning from terrorist marketsPerspectives on Politicsarticle4
2002The Fruit of Jeerson's Dinner Party: Roll Call Analysis of the Compromise of 1790 with Substantive and Relational Constraintsarticle3
2023On Some Connections between Negotiating while Fighting and Bargaining between a Buyer and SellerGamesarticle2
2018Two-sided Unobservable Investment, Bargaining, and EfficiencyReview of Economic Designarticle0
2014Informative Voting in Large Elections∗article
2012Investment, Bargaining, and Eciencyarticle
2011Credibility and Crisis Bargaining ∗article
2006Designing institutions to aggregate private beliefs and valuesQuarterly Journal of Political Sciencearticle