Trackademia

Welcome to Trackademia

The idea behind Trackademia is to build on existing academic databases like Google Scholar and OpenAlex so that you can trust the data and use it for whatever you want. That comes down to two things.

More data, and more ways to use it. We aggregate publication data from every major source into a single dataset and add information pulled from faculty CVs. Then we let you slice it however you want: choose which sources to build from, write your own formulas, weight journals, adjust for department size.

More accurate, and honest about where it isn’t. We focus on a smaller set of schools so we can verify everything carefully. Faculty lists come from department websites rather than being inferred from publication records, so we know who should be in the data before we go looking. When we can’t find data on someone, we record the gap instead of dropping them. Every number comes with a coverage rate you can check against ground truth.

Everything in Trackademia is built from seven units. AI merges duplicate records across sources and tags each publication so these categories hold up:

  • Publication — citation counts, authors, journal, peer review status, and more
  • Publication group — versions of the same work combined into one entity, such as a working paper and the article it became
  • Academic
  • Department
  • University
  • Field
  • Journal

There are two modes. In Database mode you browse the underlying records and filter by any of the seven units. In Analytics mode you get graphs and comparisons, and you switch views to compare two departments, compare one department against the average of the others, or see them all at once. Tabs let you focus on a particular level of the data.

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Academic

James Raymond Vreeland

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Academic

RankFull
As of2018 · CV
DepartmentPrinceton Politics
UniversityPrinceton
FieldPolitical Science
Scholarprofile

Totals

Publications63
Citations12,222
h-index42 · Scholar
Citations per year in post452.7
Years in post27 from the CV positions

Coverage

Works with a count46 of 63
Share73%

Positions

Professor of Politics and International Affai…2018–
Professor, Georgetown University2014–2018
Associate Professor, Georgetown University2009–2014
Associate Professor, Yale University2005–2008
Assistant Professor, Yale University1999–2005

Top venues 31 venues

The 8 holding the most of these works; 23 more hold at least one.

The Monkey Cage5
International Organization4
Journal of Conflict Resolution4
Public Choice3
International Studies Quarterly2
Journal of Deliberative Democracy2
Journal of Development Economics2
Political Analysis2

Publications per year

Works this academic published in each year, by the year each work appeared; an undated work is in no year, and a work two colleagues wrote counts for each of them. The kind, works and year filters decide which works are here at all.

Citations per year

Citations received in each year, from this academic’s verified Scholar profile, which counts every citation to everything they ever wrote: no publication filter reaches this line - not the kinds, not the works switch, not the year window on publication - and no journal weight either. It is a profile total, so it does not match the works listed below.

Publications 63 works

Every work these filters select, most cited first and the works with no count at the end: a work nobody has a figure for is unknown, never a zero to be ranked among the works that have one, and it prints an em dash. Each figure is that work’s own citations - Scholar’s count where there is one, else OpenAlex’s - and is not weighted.

YearTitleVenueKindCitations
2010Democracy and Dictatorship RevisitedPublic Choicearticle3,328
2000The Effect of IMF Programs on Economic GrowthJournal of Development Economicsarticle996
2009Development Aid and International Politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions?Journal of Development Economicsarticle987
2008The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking AnocracyJournal of Conflict Resolutionarticle974
2009Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security CouncilEuropean Economic Reviewarticle762
2011Democracy and TransparencyThe Journal of Politicsarticle742
2008Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships enter into the United Nations Convention Against TortureInternational Organizationarticle600
2014Measuring TransparencyPolitical Analysisarticle350
2015Politics and IMF ConditionalityJournal of Conflict Resolutionarticle334
2015Transparency, Protest and Autocratic InstabilityAmerican Political Science Reviewarticle322
2013Extreme Bounds of DemocracyJournal of Conflict Resolutionarticle266
2002The Effect of IMF Programs on LaborWorld Developmentarticle262
2013The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?Economic Development and Cultural Changearticle223
2013Regional Organizations and International Politics: Japanese Influence over the Asian Development Bank and the UN Security CouncilWorld Politicsarticle212
2003Why Do Governments and the IMF enter into Agreements? Statistically Selected CasesInternational Political Science Reviewarticle202
2022Bilateral or Multilateral? International Financial Flows and the Dirty-Work HypothesisThe Journal of Politicsarticle201
2008The Politics of IMF ForecastsPublic Choicearticle153
2006IMF Program Compliance: Aggregate Index versus Policy Specific Research StrategiesThe Review of International Organizationsarticle143
2023The Impact of China·s AIIB on the World BankInternational Organizationarticle130
2014The Determinants of Election to the United Nations Security CouncilPublic Choicearticle121
2019Corrupting International OrganizationsAnnual Review of Political Sciencearticle105
2013Who Moderates the Moderators? The Effect of Non-neutral Moderators in Deliberative Decision MakingJournal of Deliberative Democracyarticle99
2004Institutional Determinants of IMF AgreementseScholarship (California Digital Library)article97
2011Foreign Aid and Global Governance: Buying Bretton Woods - The Swiss-bloc caseThe Review of International Organizationsarticle88
2019Transparency, Protest and Democratic StabilityBritish Journal of Political Sciencearticle84
2011Global Governance in a Multipolar World: The Case for Regional Monetary FundsInternational Studies Reviewarticle81
2019Why Do Autocrats Disclose? Economic Transparency and Inter-elite Politics in the Shadow of Mass UnrestJournal of Conflict Resolutionarticle72
2002A Statistical Model of Bilateral CooperationPolitical Analysisarticle71
2014What the new bank of BRICS is all aboutThe Monkey Cagearticle57
2019The Millennium Development Goals and Education: Accountability and Substitution in Global AssessmentInternational Organizationarticle48
2015How to stop worrying and love the Asian Infrastructure Investment BankThe Monkey Cagearticle16
2007The Politics of IMF Conditional Lendingarticle15
2002Pakistan·s Debt of GratitudeForeign Policyarticle15
2025In-Group Punishment in International Relations: U.S. Reaction to the Founding of China·s AIIBReview of International Political Economyarticle12
2024The Effect of International Actors on Public Support for Government Spending DecisionsInternational Studies Quarterlyarticle11
2018Aid as a Building Bloc: Australia and the Bretton Woods InstitutionsAustralian Journal of Political Sciencearticle10
2013Data Disclosure, Accountability and the Facets of Transparencyarticle8
2013Calling Democracies and Dictatorships: The effect of political regime on international long-distance ratesKyklosarticle6
2026China·s Bilateral Swap Agreements and Foreign PolicyReview of International Political Economyarticle5
2010Are Davos Man's Days Numbered?article4
2010Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited, 143 PubChoice Reviews Onlinearticle4
2016Who moderates the moderatorsJournal of Deliberative Democracyarticle2
JAMES RAYMOND VREELAND. 2010.“article2
2025Do the Bretton Woods Institutions Promote Economic Transparency?Political Science Research and Methodsarticle1
2023UN Security Council membership: Increased security and reduced conflictInternational Interactionsarticle1
2012What determines democracy? And what helps to maintain it?Voxarticle0
2026Donor Influence at the African Development BankInternational Studies Quarterlyarticle
2025Do Europeans have faith in the European Union? We designed a survey to find outGood Authorityarticle
2019Fake news is bad news for democracyThe Monkey Cagearticle
2018Dirty work: Buying votes at the UN Security CouncilVoxarticle
2017Is the White House ready for these ·nightmare scenarios· in U.S. foreign policy?The Monkey Cagearticle
2016What makes governments resistant to coups? Transparency with votersThe Monkey Cagearticle
2015The Promise and Peril of Transparencyarticle
2011Change Ahead: China-US Relations at the IMFarticle
2011Lagarde's To-Do List: Let regional organizations do the hard workarticle
201010 CHF Entwicklungshilfe von jedem Schweizerarticle
2010Does the Eurozone need its own Monetary Fund?article
2009Coaching from the Sidelinesarticle
2008A symbolic step for Turkey at UNFinancial Timesarticle
2008The Politics of Common Knowledge: Ideas and Institutional Change 1 in Wage Bargaining Pepper D. Culpepper Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling…International Organizationarticle
2007James Raymond Vreeland responds to Graham Hacche’s review article [ World Economics, 8(2): 97-118] on his latest book, The International Monetary Fund: Politic…World Economyarticle
2007responds to Graham Hacche's review article [World Economics, 8 (2): 97-118] on his latest book, The International Monetary Fund: Politics of Conditional Lendingarticle
Governments use international organizations to hide contentious foreign policiesarticle